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THE LAW REVIEW ARTICLE 
PIERRE SCHLAG* 
Keywords: genre, frames, framing, scope-setting, baselines, 
flux, form, aesthetics, legal reasoning, legal scholarship, 
absurd, cass sunstein 
Abstract: What is a law review article? Does America know?  
How might we help America in this regard? Here, we 
approach the first question on the bias: As we have found, a 
growing body of learning and empirical evidence shows that 
genres are not merely forms, but forms that anticipate their 
substance. In this Article, then, we try to capture this action 
by undertaking the first and only comprehensive 
“performative study” of the genre of the law review article. 
Drawing upon methodological advances and new learning 
far beyond anything thought previously possible, we 
investigate “the law review article” qua genre. What is it? 
What does it do? What are its implications? How does it 
make you feel? 
By teasing out the infrastructural determinations section by 
section, we demonstrate rigorously that there is both far 
more (and far less) going on than meets the eye. In what is 
the first instance in the history of the United States (and 
perhaps the world) we enact in each section of the law review 
article (e.g., Part I, Part II) whatever that section is ideally 
supposed to accomplish. This is what we mean by 
“performative study.” Using this approach, the reader can 
 
* University Distinguished Professor & Byron R. White Professor of Law, 
University of Colorado. A version of this piece was presented at the IGLP 
Conference Panel on Contemporary Legal Thought at Harvard, June 2015 
organized by Christopher Tomlins and Justin Desautels-Stein where the piece 
was appreciated by some and not by others (as usual). My thanks to my friend 
Fred Bloom who provided keen advice on this piece and who is in no way 
responsible for its contents (or lack thereof). This work is part of the Tenure 
Assist Network Forum and will be promoted through Equity-More Citation 
Services. The FT Impact-Prognostics Factor was rated 4.3 (.2 tolerance) on March 
10, 2017. 
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experience first-hand what the law review article does to him 
or her IRL. In a more conventional vein, it is hoped that this 
Article will be useful to junior legal scholars, young scholars’ 
workshops, elite law school boot camps, faculty evaluation 
committees, associate deans for research, law review editors, 
and law school deans everywhere. 
The Article closes with a call for improvements to the law 
review genre, cooperative federalism, daylight savings time, 
and the nature of the universe generally. The Article is 
addressed not merely to the Court, but to the President, to 
Congress, and, of course, to “We the People.” Perhaps more 
than anything, we call for further sustained study of “the 
law review effect.” A sequel, entitled “Dissertation Disease,” 
is currently contemplated in order to undertake a similar 
study of the University Press Monograph. 
INTRODUCTION 
The most important thing at the beginning of a law review 
article is to excite the reader’s imagination, to evoke the hope 
that what comes next is truly gripping. A page-turner.  
Something totally out of the ordinary. Perhaps not even a law 
review article at all. Once this moment is reached, it must be 
brought firmly to an end, perhaps with the aid of a long 
elliptical sentence, wandering around through pointless verbal 
detours, ultimately to leave the reader disoriented and 




With this attention-grab move out of the way, and before 
the reader can recover his wits, he needs to be gentled into 
recognizing that, as with so much else in life, things sadly often 
are pretty much what they appear to be; that here, as 
elsewhere, escape and exception are unlikely, and that the 
typescript now well underway is indeed a law review article 
after all. It is time for the hook of the first paragraph to be 
domesticated into a manageable overarching statement that 
will capture the serious work to follow in the march of the 
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Parts.1 (Part I, Part II, Part III. And so on.) 
Now to be sure, none of this means that what follows 
cannot contain a bit of errant humor, a couple of gestalt shifts, 
or perhaps a flight of heroic transport. Still, in the main, the 
prose to follow will be a measured display of expertise and 
mastery—each weighted down and secured by the 
accumulating gravitas of available data sets, archival 
references, and serial bouts of case-crunching. With luck, most 
of this will be reserved for the footnotes. Meanwhile, in the 
text, seriousness is in the offing. Moderation and 
reasonableness predicted. Yes, there will be some romance 
(glimmers of utopia visible), but in the main, we will be doing 
accounting. Literally or figuratively. Accounting and 
documentation. 
Voila. We are only at the fifth paragraph and already 
expectations have been excited, subdued, and dramatically 
lowered. Thus cowed into submission, the reader is prepared to 
undertake the familiar journey. With readerly expectations 
thus reset, it is the time to lower the burden of argument, as 
well. This can be done explicitly (not very good form) or 
through a more subtle frame-setting. 
We will call the frame-setting happening now “entry-
framing” so as to distinguish it from other kinds of framing 
that will occur later in the law review article. Among other 
things, entry-framing allows the author to elicit certain kinds 
of readerly attention (and inattention) as well as readerly 
hopes (and anxieties). This is the law review equivalent of the 
trial lawyer’s opening argument. It is a question of putting 
certain audience faculties and orientations on high alert, while 
lulling others to sleep. What we have here is what Althusser 
called “interpellation”—the calling forth of a particular self,  
oriented and motivated to undertake certain ideologically 
structured roles, tasks, functions2 (and crucially, not certain 
others). Genres can do that. Yes, they can. 
In the main, we will be foregrounding and backgrounding. 
Certain issues, problems, questions, actors, agencies, action 
will be placed front and center. Others will be set backstage or 
 
 1. Reference is made here to David Foster Wallace’s incomparable 
description of the plane flight of the tax auditor. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THE 
PALE KING (2011).   
 2. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN 
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 175–76 (Ben Brewster trans., 1972). 
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even off-stage. For the committed advocate, entry-framing is 
the place to smuggle in the most controversial claims and to do 
so not in the guise of claims at all, but rather more subtly as 
unobserved aspects of the scene.3 
Soon it will be time to close the Introduction. But first we 
need to pose the inquiry that will organize all that is yet to 
come. What inquiry? Note that it will have to be the sort of 
inquiry that is susceptible to a plausible resolution through law 
or law-like surrogates. The law-like surrogates are not quite 
law, but take the place of law. “Legal theory,” for instance, is a 
law-surrogate. Legal theory often presents itself (without ever 
actually saying so) as the law of laws, the norm of norms, the 
doctrine of the doctrines. Occasionally, we will put entire 
disciplines or sub-disciplines in charge like this. But only if 
they are good law-surrogates (in other words, only if they 
already exhibit law-like aesthetics). Economic analysis and 
analytical philosophy come to mind. 
The important thing in articulating the inquiry to be 
pursued is that the formulation must be stated in such a way 
as to render resolution possible. The point is obvious and 
nearly indisputable: law review writers never discuss that 
which they cannot fix. No one writes a law review article where 
the end line reads: “Well, in conclusion, it seems like we’re all 
pretty much screwed.” That simply doesn’t happen. Which 
means—and this is important—that if ever we were screwed, 
you wouldn’t hear about it in a law review article. Ever. In fact, 
the more thoroughly and intensely screwed we are, the less 
likely you would be to hear about it in a law review article. 
 
Weird, isn’t it? Yes. But it’s like that. 
 
Let’s not think about it too much. The really important 
thing, always in a law review article, is to carry on. 
Perfectionism is the enemy. Capital letters and periods are 
your friends. Keep moving. 
On the bright side, the commitment to address only those 
 
 3. Kenneth Burke’s “dramatistic approach” helpfully shows how narratives, 
ideologies, and philosophies can emphasize different theatrical terms (scene, 
agent, agency, action, purpose) to achieve a variety of rhetorical effects. Here, I 
am suggesting that one of the classic ruses of rhetoricians lies in using entry-
framing to ensconce their more controversial claims as aspects of the scene so that 
these are registered as a background given (or not registered at all). KENNETH 
BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION (1966).  
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problems we can resolve renders topic selection much easier 
than might first appear. As with so many other things in life, 
the thing to do is to start at the end and reverse engineer. That 
is what lawyers do for their clients and what we legal 
academics do for our particular juridical utopias. 
So then, what is the inquiry here? Very simply, it is an 
inquiry into the character of the law review article qua formal 
artifact. Formal as in “of form,” formal as in “formative,” and 
formal as in “formalism.” The basic idea is that the very form of 
the law review article is stylized and thus ineluctably enacts, 
narrows, and channels what can be said and thought.4 
Notice that in and of itself, this is not a terribly interesting 
insight. Of course, that’s what the law review article does! So 
do the dissertation, the picaresque novel, and the comic book.  
What else is to be expected? The thing that is of interest isn’t 
that the law review article qua artifact is constraining, 
channeling, or enabling. The interesting thing lies in the how of 
it all—how and in what ways does the law review article enact, 
narrow, and channel thought? That is the inquiry we will 
pursue here. 
Begin by considering what sort of overarching structure is 
appropriate for a law review article. The genre furnishes the 
answer.5 Indeed, genres always furnish their own answers. 
That is both the virtue and vice of genres. To give an example, 
it is commonly said that in novels there are only two kinds of 
stories to tell: “A Stranger Comes to Town” and “Someone Goes 
on a Journey.”6 The same is true of a law review article, except 
 
 4. It also, of course, opens up and sets forth the pathways for deviation and 
subversion. A close study of the law review text/footnote law interactions across 
the last 100 years would be worth its own empirical study. An analysis of the 
changing hierarchies implicit in the Bluebook across the last 100 years would also 
warrant attention. These kinds of micro-phenomena are hugely important as both 
indicia and regulators of legal form—not the least reason being they go generally 
unnoticed.  
 5. Genre studies is a vital field of study crossing a number of disciplines 
(literary criticism, rhetoric, political theory, etc.). In my very preliminary effort 
here, I will not get into the many interesting internecine disputes that comprise 
the field. For a very useful cross-cutting introduction to genre studies, see ANIS S. 
BAWARSHI & MARY JO REIF, GENRE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND PEDAGOGY (2010). It should be recognized that a “law review 
article” is not just a genre, but simultaneously an artifact, a disciplinary 
mechanism, a triage and certification device, a marketing tool, a . . . . All these 
other matters—the political economy of legal scholarship—I leave aside here.  
 6. The number 2 can be taken as a first approximation of the number 64—as 
in 64 stories to tell.  
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that with a law review article, it’s not much of a journey (the 
starting point and the end point are rarely all that far apart) 
and strangers—at least real strangers—rarely come to town.7 
In the event real strangers do come to town, they are 
quickly sent packing and enjoined never to come by again. All 
in all, in a law review article, there is only one story to tell, and 
the variants are almost always the same: “There is a problem, 
a conflict, an issue, a puzzle, a contradiction, a paradox, an 
aporia in the law. This Article will resolve it using the 
approved m.o.’s of juridical discourse.” 
Notice that we are fast reaching the limits of the average 
attention span for an introduction. The reader is likely to 
become impatient. If an oral presentation is at stake (faculty 
workshop?), listeners even more so. This is the point where the 
author should relieve the tension created by offering up a joke. 
Preferably something subtle. Failing that, something rude and 
abrupt. 
PART I 
Here in Part I, the author seeks to elaborate, fortify, and 
cement the frames already activated in the Introduction. This 
is called scope-setting and it involves a formalization and 
specification of the entry-frame evoked and activated in the 
Introduction. Scope-setting involves carving out of Maitland’s 
seamless web of history (or by implication, law) some relatively 
discrete something amenable to investigation or analysis or 
argument—call it, the object of inquiry. Again, it is best, 
rhetorically speaking, not to be too obvious about the whole 
thing. But that is hard to do—particularly if we attend to what 
we are doing—as indeed Maitland does: 
Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavors 
to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a 
seamless web . . . . The web must be rent; but as we rend it, 
we may watch the whence and whither of a few of the 
severed and ravelling threads which have been making a 
 
 7. On the law review article as a prototypical example of the “hero’s 
journey,” see Omri Ben-Zvi & Eden Sarid, Legal Scholarship as Spectacular 
Failure (forthcoming 2017) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review).  
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pattern too large for any man’s eye.8  
It’s hard to detach from the beauty and violence of Maitland’s 
lyrical touch. Still, pay no mind. We are called to move on. This 
is a law review article. Capitals followed by periods. Periods 
followed by capitals. Footnote. Footnote. Footnote. Just keep 
moving. 
The next step is to stabilize the putative object of inquiry 
in one or a few, but certainly not many, disciplinary contexts.  
The reason we want a few (and not many) contexts is so that it 
becomes possible to say something about the object of inquiry, 
as opposed to . . . having to say everything about it. (You people 
who do cultural legal studies, pay no attention here.) 
The most interesting thing about scope-setting is that it is 
utterly impossible. Indeed, of all the perfectly preposterous 
moments in a law review article, scope-setting is among the 
most outrageous and improbable of them all. It cannot be done. 
It cannot succeed.9 And yet—like petitionary prayer or the 
claim of Supreme Court nominees that they will follow the law, 
not make it—it is done all the time.10 
Scope-setting is the point where, if we had a lucid author, 
he would close his laptop, dim the lights, reach for the scotch, 
and brood various gloomy thoughts about his ill-chosen career. 
A person of real integrity would think seriously about taking 
up writer’s block. 
 
Obviously, that does not include anyone here. 
 
Why is scope-setting impossible? I refuse to go into it. If I 
go into it, you and I will be wandering this text for hours, 
possibly days. O.K. Never mind, here it is really quickly:  
Everything we, as moderns, think we know about law and 
 
 8. Frederic William Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L. 
QTRLY REV. 13 (1898). 
 9. For elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble—Something 
Amiss in Expertopia, in IN SEARCH OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Chris 
Tomlins & Justin Desautels-Stein eds., Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming 
2016) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741144 [https://perm 
a.cc/JYB6-PAYN] [hereinafter, Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble].   
 10. Now here I should caution that many writings in law reviews are not law 
review articles at all. That is to say, that they deviate so substantially from the 
genre that they might be classified as something else. I point this out because 
these other writings may not have a scope-setting problem. They may have other 
problems, but they could well evade this one.  
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world—Maitland’s “seamless web,” the butterfly effect,11 
Piaget’s nesting,12 Thomas Reed Powell’s “legal mind,”13 
Sartre’s “worm at the heart of being,”14 Derrida’s 
“Differance,”15 Lyotard’s Differend,16—all of this and so much 
more tell us incontrovertibly that scope-setting in law (as in so 
much of social life generally) is an illusory act. It is, to put it all 
too simply, an attempt by force of text to impose a static frame 
on matters we know or at least strongly believe will not stay 
put and almost always exceed any and all efforts at conceptual 
containment.17 (You people who do analytical jurisprudence 
and are still into necessary and sufficient conditions, pay no 
attention here.) 
Now, I am not actually going to offer up an argument for 
this view, but will instead offer a quote from Bakhtin that I 
have been saving on several succeeding generations of laptops. 
As it’s beginning to look (given the track record) that the quote 
has a good chance of going entirely unused, I have decided to 
use it now. Here goes: 
The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically 
agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, 
value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex 
interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, 
intersects with yet a third group: and this may crucially 
 
 11. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS THEORY: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1988) (the 
metaphorical notion “that a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can 
transform storm systems next month in New York”).  
 12. JEAN PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM, 28–29 (Chaninah Maschler trans., 1970) 
(the notion that there is no form or content per se, but rather that the two are 
relations such that a given form is content for some other form and so on and so 
forth).   
 13. Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an 
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting Thomas Reed Powell: “If you can 
think about something which is attached to something else without thinking 
about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind.”). 
 14. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 21 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 
1956) (“Nothingness lies coiled like a worm at the heart of being.”). 
 15. JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978) 
(explaining differance as a neological “non-concept” for the structural incapacity of 
any meaning to coincide with itself—it is thus always different and always 
deferred (hence, Derrida’s coinage of the neologism differance)).  
 16. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE xi 
(Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 2002) (conceptualizing a differend as a conflict 
between two parties that cannot be equitably resolved because of the absence of a 
rule or principle fairly applicable to both arguments).   
 17. I go into it here. Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note 9.   
11. 88.4 SCHLAG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  4:13 PM 
2017] THE LAW REVIEW ARTICLE 1051 
shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, 




Perhaps the quote is worth a second read? No? Just a 
thought. Bakhtin really does trigger the right sort of confusion. 
It is important to be confused sometimes. If you are doing law 
and you are not ever (ever) confused, then you are simply not 
paying attention. So come on, a second look? No? 
 
O.K. Moving on then. 
PART II 
This would be the literature review and methodology 
section. 
 
O.K. Well, enough of that.19 
 
PART III 
Here we get to the theory part of the law review article.  
This is the part that could well be nearly unintelligible to law 
review editors† and might well lead one or more (or possibly all 
of them) to question whether the article should be published at 
all. The disturbing question will loom for the editors—does this 
 
 18. M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 276 (Michael 
Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981).  
 19. It is possible that in this section, the reader will be apprised that while 
the issues have been discussed before in enlightening ways, prior discussions have 
been less than satisfactory. (Here “less than satisfactory” is a technical phrase 
meaning roughly, “not even worth a glance after my Article.”) The reader will then 
be told that prior discussions very likely have miscast or misprised the crucial 
issues. Or that they have failed to plumb the full depths of the dilemma. Or that 
there is some new learning, as yet untapped. Or yet again that prior work may 
have deployed the wrong methods or proceeded from the wrong vantages 
or . . . (and so on). After this recitation of past failures, the author must announce 
that, in sharp (and wholly improbable) contrast to all prior discussions, the 
instant Article will take a different approach. Specifically: where countless other 
articles have failed (body counts are still being tabulated) the present Article will 
succeed. Yes! 
† Editors’ note: No, we totally get it. 
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author actually know his or her stuff or is the law review about 
to embarrass itself in print . . . from here to eternity? It is at 
this point that credentialism can help.  Indeed, the right email 
address, the right zip code, the right authorial name, the 
extensive listing of notable names in the first vetting footnote—
all of these things are extremely useful to allay fears or 
concerns. I mean, if the author has the right provenance and 
certifications and still the article crashes . . . I mean, who 
would have thought—right? 
 
Let’s dig in. 
 
Notice that all the difficulties that throttle the possibility 
of scope-setting—let’s give them a name: let’s call them 
agencies of flux and disturbance—are not matters that we can 
fix by addressing them explicitly. That will not do because, of 
course, when we address these agencies of flux and disturbance 
(“AFAD”) explicitly in our texts, we do so by first trying to 
stabilize them—which is to say, we try to do the very thing that 
Bakhtin, and later Derrida, describe as impossible. 
Still, many of our readers do not read Bakhtin (“Who?”) or 
Derrida (“Oh yeah, that guy”) and so there is some possibility 
that when AFAD is mentioned in our texts, AFAD will stay 
put. AFAD is AFAD. Perhaps the best way to establish that 
AFAD can be stabilized is to break it down into its constituent 





See—it works. Justice Scalia famously used the same m.o. in 
the case of District of Columbia v. Heller to decipher the 
meaning of the Second Amendment’s right “to keep and bear 
arms.”20 According to Justice Scalia, there are four parts to the 




 20. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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B 
A 
Justice Scalia’s approach was in stark opposition to Justice 
Stevens who in dissent analyzed the thing as follows: 
R 
KBA 





or is it . . . 
R 
KBA? 
The important thing here is to try to keep a straight face 
through it all. 
 
The eyes of the law review article editor are glazing over. 
The mind wanders. Images come into focus: a drop of 
condensation sliding down a cold glass of Sauvignon Blanc, the 
liquid gold of a rye on the rocks. Steam swirling upward from a 
cup of espresso on a cold white marble table. The rain outside 
has stopped. The streetlights and the puddles sparkle. All 
right. Everybody take a break. 
 
O.K. Break over. 
 
Remember AFAD and the quote from Bakhtin above? 
 
Imagine now that we treat AFAD—the “agencies of flux 
and disturbance”—seriously. If we start delving seriously into 
AFAD, things will likely get dynamic, mutable, and 
uncontainable. That in turn would be antithetical to the 
obvious aims of the law review article—namely, to present an 
identifiable, stabilized, stand-alone, portable, off-the-shelf, bit 
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of knowledge—supported by a massive and eminently 
forgettable substructure of documents, data, and other such 
artifacts.21 
If that is the desired endpoint, then it is desirable to 
minimize the flux and disturbance at inception. Indeed, the 
genre of the law review article is a performative confirmation 
that the best way to reach the end of an argument successfully 
is, well . . . to begin very close to the end while claiming 
nonetheless to start very far away.22 
PART IV 
This part is generally the pièce de resistance—the place 
where the argument kicks in. This is the place where things 
are really going to happen. Picking up the thread in Part I, the 
crucial question is whether there is something entrenched in 
the genre we know as the law review article that effectively 
contributes to its stabilizing effects. 
Uhm—yes. Emphatically so. Notice that one way of 
thinking about the law review article is that it is itself at the 
level of form a precipitation, a freezing of the state of the art of 
legal thought and legal knowledge. More vexingly, it may be a 
freezing at the level of form of the state of art circa fifty or a 
hundred years ago. 
Where intellectual life (or indeed, any kind of life) is 
concerned, freezing is seldom an auspicious metaphor. In law, 
we are supposedly beyond the freeze-dried forms of formalism. 
And yet in the highly stylized character of the law review 
article, its stock of stereotyped gestures, its relentless pretense 
to knowledge, its predictable (and predictably inconclusive) 
policy and principle analysis, we repeatedly comply with the 
form . . . which, when you think about it is all that formalism 
really needs to survive.23 
 
 21. See Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note 9.  
 22. See generally the work of . . . .  
 23. This brings us oddly to the Bluebook, which, in its 524-page 
crystallization of space-saving abbreviations and stylized citation rules, regulates 
the hierarchies, reductions, equations, contraries, negations, etc., that comprise 
the organization of contemporary legal knowledge. The Bluebook, in all its 
hypertrophic glory, is an extraordinary accomplishment: It is an important 
regulatory protocol of contemporary legal knowledge. (This is not entirely a 
compliment.) For an eminently justifiable critical assessment, see Richard A. 
Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850 (2011).  
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A question now: Why do we honor such a dated and 
possibly archaic form? Why is it that legal academics don’t 
break out more often? Why do they, for instance, repeatedly 
seek out the protective shelter and over-used pathways of a 
sub-disciplinary genre (e.g., ELS) or a grand maître (e.g., 
Foucault) and try so (so) hard to conform to its methodologies 
or his protocols, respectively? What is the draw of compliance 
and submission for academics? What is it that appeals in this 
quest for paradigm-compliance? Why are they doing this? 
The little homunculus on my shoulder is already 
whispering an answer in my ear: “Because they’re academics, 
dude. Focus! This is academia. It’s what they do. It’s who they 
are. Pay attention, dude!” The aspiration, the affect, and the 
ideal may be intellectual achievement. But the practice and the 
reality is academia. “Forget it Jake, it’s . . . .” 
 
But I do not listen to the homunculus. And instead, I ask 
again: 
 
Why do this? Why paradigm-compliance? 
 
This calls for explanation. And I would try my hand at it, 
but for the fact that in the post-postness of our post-millennial 
moment, explanation of social phenomena is either way too 
facile or, if one has real standards, insuperably difficult. 
Here I want to refer to an anonymous speaker who at a 
recent colloquium presciently asked, referring to the 
phenomenon he was busily describing, “Why is this 
happening?” 
Yes, indeed, why? I wondered. In fact, why is this 
colloquium happening? Why are you happening? Why am I? 
Hell, why is anything happening? Point being, of course, that 
the question (why is this happening?) immediately points to the 
impossibility of the answer. The “why?” in question will only be 
answered within a frame that everyone pretends is already 
stabilized (when, of course, it is not) for a subject presumed to 
be universal (but who could not possibly be) from a limited set 
of vantages and specified orientations (which, of course, are 
neither). 
 
“Why is this happening?” Really? You dare ask that? This 
late in the game? 
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Here I want to refer to the work of Professor Max Stein 
who in my recently published novel, “American Absurd” 
(currently available at competitive prices on Amazon and 
elsewhere), tries to do what he calls “the structures of the 
meaningless.” Fighting off what could be a bad case of writer’s 
block, Max Stein has been striving to figure out why the other 
human beings around him are persistently pursuing 
meaningless human activities—going from A to B over and 
over again, without, it seems, actually getting anywhere. Or at 
least, that’s the way it seems. In any event, Professor Stein has 
made a list—a preliminary inventory of the possible 
permutations: 
 
A to B (progression) 
A to A (stasis) 
A to B which becomes an A for another B, etc. (serial repetition— 
neurosis) 
A to B followed by B to A (circularity) 
A never get to B (futility) 
A to nowhere (nihilism) 
Why B? (skepticism) 
What B? (radical skepticism) 




But why go from A to B? Yes, why indeed? Here too 
Professor Stein has compiled a preliminary list: 
 
Because B is better than A (progress) 
Because we’re fated (destiny) 
Because we’re hardwired (human nature) 
Because we so choose (existentialism) 
Because that’s what our people do (sociology) 
Because we have false consciousness (Marxism) 
Because no one has yet thought of anything else.25 
 
After compiling these lists, Professor Max Stein notes that the 
 
 24. PIERRE SCHLAG, AMERICAN ABSURD 124–25 (2016).  
 25. Id. at 125. 
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patterns and the explanations are all too facile. 
Indeed. As the Charles M. Fairmont Chair in Cognitive 
and Rhetorical Studies at Berkeley (and a fictional character), 
Max Stein only occasionally writes about law.26 But his points 
are no less applicable to our field. In law, if we are seeking 
explanation, we might ask, “Why is this particular law the way 
it is?” Well, consider the classic forms of the available answers: 
Because of this law’s object. Because of this law’s context. 
Because other laws are the way they are and not something 
else. Torts is torts because it is not busy being property. That’s 
because property is busy being property.27 Because our 
sentence structures always have subjects doing things by way 
of verbs to direct objects thus secreting entailment (e.g., causal) 
links right and left.28 Because . . . . 
Max Stein is hardly a nihilist, but he does appreciate that 
the explanations he catalogues are academic fictions that work 
in part because they track not only language, but the folk-logic 
of cultural myths. When we, as academics, track these fictions, 
they cannot help but resonate with the myths. 
But, as Max Stein notes, our trouble is that we have lots of 
myths. And so there are lots and lots of resonances. And 
everything is overdetermined (lots of resonance) and under-
determined (pay attention to the entry-frame setting that 
artificially narrows the range of possibilities). 
 
Oh, it’s all so complicated! 
 
Well, uh, no, actually—it’s not. Not complicated at all if 
you’ve been following what I am saying. It’s just that accepting 
what I am saying is not going to make your life as an academic 
any easier. On the contrary, accepting what I am saying is 
going to make your life as an academic considerably more 
 
 26. Pierre Schlag, The Faculty Workshop, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 807, 821–22 (2012) 
(comments of Max Stein on “stage 4” and “gaming”).   
 27. If property were not busy doing its property thing, then torts might have 
to step in and do some of this property work. (Then property would look 
different.). 
 28. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter Kaufmann ed., 
Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). Nietzsche observed:  
Our bad habit of taking a mnemonic, an abbreviative formula, to be an 
entity, finally as a cause, e.g., to say of lightning “it flashes.” Or the little 
word “I.” To make a kind of perspective in seeing the cause of seeing: 
that was what happened in the invention of the “subject,” the “I!”  
Id. at 294, § 548.  
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difficult. It will certainly be harder for you to write that next 
law review article. I actually think that’s a good thing and will 
make things a whole lot more fun for the rest of us, but I totally 
get it if you are tired or otherwise don’t agree. 
From my admittedly idiosyncratic perspective, it does not 
help entirely here (though it does help some) that when we 
academics meet together across the mediation of a screen or a 
text or a podium, we spend our time testing our respective 
fictions against each other to see which fiction will resonate 
more emphatically than the others. Most of us focus on the 
contestation—the points of disagreement, dissonance, and 
disjuncture. We are natural born critics. And if we are not, 
then training or occupation will make us so. 
One could reasonably think then, what with all this 
criticism and reciprocal scrutiny of each others’ work, that we 
are getting somewhere. Well, maybe. And then again, maybe 
not:  it is important to recognize that amidst the sometimes 
acute reciprocal criticism, there is a congenial symbiosis and at 
least a weak unity underlying our particular contest of 
faculties. Indeed, the expression of our differences 
performatively re-enforces a shared form, aesthetics, narrative 
structure, style—one which at a fundamental level affirms the 
cheery sense that law and world are ultimately understandable 
in terms of entailments within webs of intelligibility. 
We make the connections the best we can. We differ to be 
sure in our preferred verbs. Here I offer a typology (always a 
good move in a law review article and very much appreciated 
by the reader). 
 
TABLE 1: A TYPOLOGY 
Linear Entailment. For those predisposed to one-way linear 
entailment, it can be said that X causes, constitutes, 
structures, performs, logically determines, reflects, shapes, 
and/or justifies Y. (Viewed grammatically, and with due 
attention to “lumpiness” and “indivisibilities,” the choices 
here are not endless.)29 
Reciprocal Entailment. For those predisposed to reciprocal 
 
 29. On lumpiness, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012). On indivisibilities, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of 
Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1669–71 & nn.20–21 (1989). 
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entailment, one adds adjectives that morph the one-way 
relation into much more problematic two-way relations: 
hence the relations are dialectical, dynamic, interactive, 
cyclical, looped, and so on. 
Dedifferentiation. For those willing to consider even more 
unsettling understandings in which the identities collapse 
into each other (thus making relations impossible) concepts 
such as dedifferentiation beckon.30 
Are these three types of entailment fictions? Well, maybe 
so. But even then, they are plotted fictions. And many of them 
are plotted in ways sufficiently enduring (social construction) 
that they become the plots of our thinking and our lives. These 
illusions are made real through collective action (inter alia, 
law) and realized as institutional practice (inter alia, law 
again) which is to say that they are, at least, in part true. Or 
more accurately, they are made true. 
Is this something to complain about? Well, no, not 
obviously. Look at it this way: it may well be that repeating 
these fictions are all we can hope for from our academic forays. 
And maybe that’s just fine. Why would it be just fine? Because 
describing law and world in tried-and-true fictional forms of 
entailment and webs of cultural intelligibility is what 
explanation and understanding mean (even if entailments and 
the webs of intelligibility are themselves fictions). Perhaps this 
is all there is—and until someone comes up with something 
else, all there is is just fine. 
 
Or at least, it will have to do. Maybe. 
 
Two nagging thoughts remain. 
 
Thought One. The more we awaken, the more we will find 
that our intellectual efforts are haunted by the possibility that 
we are not really thinking at all, but simply rehearsing 
conventional narratives of entailment. We think we are 
explaining and understanding, but in point of fact, maybe legal 
academic work is just an extraordinarily intense version of 
 
 30. See generally Pierre Schlag, The Dedifferentiation Problem, 42 
CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 35 (2009).   
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connect the dots—a kind of ratiocinative compulsion prefigured 
for us by forces and structures whose identity and workings we 
do not (yet) appreciate or fully understand. 
Or in Niels Bohr’s admonition, “No, no, you’re not 
thinking; you’re just being logical.”31 Coming to this realization 
could be kind of dispiriting. Consider: for all our careful 
collection and painstaking assembly of evidence and our 
elaborate presentation of argument in the law review article, it 
would all nonetheless be only one more repetition of the master 
patterns of our disciplines. Even the most innovative moments 
might be seen as rehearsal and repetition. Hence, for instance, 
Bruce Ackerman’s distinction between “higher lawmaking” and 
“normal  politics,” could be seen as law’s approximation of 
Thomas Kuhn’s “revolutionary” versus “normal” science.32  
Ackerman’s famous “constitutional moments” might be seen as 
a juridical mimesis of Kuhnian “paradigm shifts”? Dworkin’s 
Hercules could be seen as . . . .33 
No, I have to stop this. It’s not nice. And it’s cheap. 
Everyone would fall here. You, me. Everyone. And even if it is 
right, so what? Surely we’ve known all along that to be creative 
in a good way means precisely this—the new, unexpected, and 
previously unremarked enactment of a possible permutation 
within the allowed structural possibilities? 
O.K. But what if we are not Ackerman or Dworkin? (Note, 
there is considerable evidence that we are not.) What if the 
patterns we’re enacting are more pedestrian, more routine? Or 
to say it outright: what if the patterns are banal? Are we really 
needed? Are you? Am I? All right, enough! This is not Paris 
1938. This is not beer spilling from the glass onto the table. 
This is a law review article. I apologize. I got carried away.  
Let’s move on. 
Well, not yet. Perhaps the genre really is irredeemable—an 
effort to please judges, students, lawyers, law professors that in 
the end pleases no one? Perhaps it is time for it to go down and 
to be replaced by a more creative, thought-inspiring type of 
legal writing. True—the genre as it stands has exchange value 
 
 31. Attributed to Niels Bohr in William Glen, How Science Works in The 
Mass-Extinction Debates, in THE MASS-EXTINCTION DEBATES: HOW SCIENCE 
WORKS IN A CRISIS 62 (1994).  
 32. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6, 21–22 (1993); 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 7, 50 (2012).  
 33. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 242 (1986). 
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for authors and law schools (triage, certification, and 
branding). The question is, does the genre have any use value 
in its present incarnation? Or is it instead the remains of an 
archaic jurisprudence sustained in a kind of intellectual 
Chapter 11 because neither legal academics nor law review 
editors have the chutzpah to break out of the collective mimesis 




Thought Two. The mutually re-enforcing aspect of the 
contest of fictions seems to yield a discourse in which we (you 
and I) try not merely to make truth, but to evaluate whether 
and to what degree truth has indeed been made (or, in an older 
idiom, found). This evaluation procedure (conducted in articles, 
workshops, conferences, etc.)  is a kind of academic meta-fiction 
organized into what might be called “rightness disputes.” 
Rightness disputes are not the same thing as a quest for 
rightness (in the same sense that OCD is not the same thing as 
checking the stove before you go out). The pursuit of rightness 
(like checking the stove) are generally good things to do. By 
contrast, rightness disputes (like OCD) seem to be sustained 
forays into the repetitive and the overwrought. 
In rightness disputes, the little homunculus on your 
shoulder is on speed. He is constantly asking you (even as you 
are writing your article or giving your talk), “Is this right?”  
“What arguments support your views?” “What establishes the 
validity of your argument?” “Is this claim consistent with your 
priors?” “Didn’t you say that . . . and now you say that . . . .” 
And here you are trying to write your article or give your talk, 
but still the little speed-addled homunculus interrupts to ask, 
“Do you have a warrant for that?” “Where is the empirical 
corroboration?” “On what authority?” “This needs to be more 
precise—there are at least four subdivisions you need to make 
and address here.” 
 
And the little homunculus seems to have a Greek chorus as 
backup: “Subdivide and subsume!” “Specify and distinguish!” 
“Justify and redeem!” “Corroborate and confirm!” 
 
And sooner or later, you might realize (if so, it would come 
to you with the force of revelation) that the little homunculus 
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and the Greek correctness chorus do not care a wit—not one 
wit—whether you are right or not. What they care about—the 
only thing they care about—is playing rightness disputes. And 
then it might dawn on you that so do all the other people in the 
room. And at that point it might dawn on you that rightness 
disputes are no more about rightness than OCD is about 
turning off the stove. 
And then yet another realization arrives—this one truly 
upsetting: It turns out that the topic of your talk, the very 
object of your legal passion, the very focus of your jural raison 
d’être, does not matter to the people in the room either. They 
are just using your article and your talk—hell, they are using 
you (yes, you!)—as the terrain on which to play out their 
rightness disputes. Your article, your talk, you could be about 
anything—anything at all! 
And as you come to recognize this, you have this deep 
sense of déjà vu. You’ve experienced this before. And then 
finally it hits you: Oh, my god, you are a junior associate again! 
Totally generic. Totally replaceable. Totally formalized into an 
abstraction of yourself. You are back to the place you tried so 
hard to escape from. How did it come to this? Why is this 
happening? 
And then yet another realization breaks through: there is 
such a thing as rightness disputes. Rightness disputes are the 
trans-disciplinary or sur-disciplinary structure of academic 
knowledge production. It’s the lingua franca of academia! 
Thirty years ago, it was “where’s your epistemic warrant—
where do you stand to say that?” Twenty years ago, it was, 
“where’s your methodology?” Ten years ago, it was, “where’s 
your empirical backup?” Today, it’s . . . . There’s kind of odd 
sameness to it all isn’t there? I mean if you allow for slight 
shifts in semantics and orientation, it’s basically the same 





Of course, notice it would all be O.K. if one were convinced 
that the frames that enable the rightness disputes to get off the 
ground were not themselves so contestable, so compromised. 
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But they are compromised—aren’t they?34 
PART V 
There is a real irony in rightness disputes. The irony is 
that with rightness disputes, there is no reason a law review 
article should ever end. In the same way that checking the 
stove one more time (please note the marginal cost is low) 
couldn’t possibly hurt (“I’m gonna make doubly sure this time”), 
asking one more rightness question is relatively costless as 
well. Come on, just one more. 
 
No? O.K. Good for you. 
 
This then brings us to what I call exit-framing and 
abandonment. Exit-framing as its name implies is the frame 
the author leaves the reader. 
There is the explicit exit-frame. This could be an edict. Or a 
balancing test or a nexus test or a default regime or a totality 
of circumstances test or an injunction to prove effect by 
reference to intent or intent by reference to effect. Or . . . . In 
short, any of the usual legal formulae can serve as exit 
framing. 
There is also the implicit exit-frame. We won’t go into the 
complexities on this one except to note that . . . . No. We just 
won’t. 
With explicit exit-framing, there is a choice to be made by 
the author here: an edict is not a balancing test is not a default 
regime (though we could combine all three). And so the 
question is not just how did we get here (why balancing?). 
Presumably, I’ve got that covered.35 Actually, the really 
interesting question is how we stop. This is the moment I call 
 
 34. This is the gist of the overarching set of inquiries pursued more 
intensively in The Knowledge Bubble. Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note 
9; Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).  
 35. Well, actually, no I don’t. You and I generally know, of course, from the 
tone of any given law review article which way it’s heading. When we get to the 
exit-frame, it’s hardly a surprise. In fact, very often we know from the entry-frame 
what the exit-frame will look like. And yet I have to say, I am always a bit jolted 
when the edict, the test, is actually delivered there on page whatever. Jolted as 
in—really? You, the author, are actually going to do this to me (to us) again? Do 
you have any idea (of course, you do) how many times this particular stylized 
solution has been presented in similar circumstances before? I mean, couldn’t you 
have thought of doing something else? Why is this happening?   
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abandonment. In order to have an exit-framing, you need to 
have abandonment. 
If you’re a judge, you need to decide that you’ve addressed 
the arguments by the parties sufficiently and that you must 
now simply decide. If you’re a law review writer, you need to 
determine that enough is enough, that the argument must 
cease and the rightness disputes stop. But how do you do that? 
How do you let go? Why not another question? Come on, just 
one more. How could it hurt? 
 
See: It’s hard to stop. 
 
How then do you do it? 
CONCLUSION 
Right. Exactly.  
 
Now among the several sections of the law review article 
vying for most preposterous, the Conclusion is undoubtedly the 
most stone cold absurd of them all. The Conclusion is just 
simply preposterous. 
Interestingly, it is often the place where readers will turn 
to first. If that happens to be you right now, things are 
probably not working out so well. In fact my guess is that 
you’re probably wondering what’s going on here? How in the 
hell is this a conclusion? Why is this happening? 
 
What to do?  My advice—go read the Introduction. 
 
For all you others, well, here we are again. You and I. On 
different sides of the text that is supposed to yield a conclusion. 
 
The Conclusion is supposed to be the wrap. Almost always 
it will be a normative wrap. Perhaps not so much because we 
are committed normative thinkers (this is 2000-something not 
1990) but rather because law review editors want some 
normative payoff and law review authors comply. The 
normative wrap is the academic equivalent of the legal brief’s 
prayer for relief. It all comes down to this—a few paragraphs, a 
string of sentences—the takeaway. 
The author, of course, has reason to feel pretty good about 
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reaching this point. Not only is an arduous law review journey 
coming to an end, but this is the moment where the author 
hands off responsibility to the reader. It’s as if the author were 
telling the reader, “O.K., reader, my work is done now. You 
take it from here. You should . . . the court should . . . the 
agency should . . . somebody should . . . .” That’s quite a 
responsibility to place on the reader. It could cause anxiety if 
not properly handled. 
In truth, this should be a moment of high anxiety for 
everyone involved (not just the reader). The author, too. In fact, 
the legal academic community generally. Why? Well, because it 
is almost never clear, not clear at all, just what mechanism is 
supposed to bridge the yawning gap between the words on the 
page and the enactment of the recommended action.36 And that 
is because, just possibly, there may be none. Or maybe it’s 
because . . .  
 
 36. Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610–11 
(1986) (on the persistent chasm in law between thought and action). I have made 
much of such chasms in the critiques of normativity. One of the variants is 
contained in an essay called “Values,” which describes how legal actors 
appropriate values and value-talk to service the imperatives of bureaucratic law. 
See generally Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUM. 219 (1994).  
